Carnegie Moscow Center
Aware of his new reputation as “Baku’s candidate,” Pashinyan will likely try to negotiate small victories, such as getting more prisoners of war released, and pass these off as the results of his firm position. Building on that, he will promise bigger victories soon to come, such as the transit of goods to Russia via Azerbaijan.
Washington’s recognition of the Armenian genocide is far from the main problem in U.S.-Turkish relations, which have been in crisis now for several years.
Russia will likely watch how the Armenian election campaign unfolds, helping first one side and then the other. It has many levers of influence there, but not enough to assume complete control.
Armenian diplomacy will depend far more on external factors from now on. A multi-vector foreign policy will remain in its national interests, but now that will be easier said than done.
In Russia—both in expert circles and in the corridors of power—the possibility of Saakashvili reentering Georgian politics, never mind returning to power, is seen as little short of a catastrophe. But putting emotions to one side, it’s clear that Georgian Dream’s foreign policy differs little from its predecessor’s.
Europe has a role to play in rebuilding the South Caucasus and promoting a sustainable future. One important dividend would be democracy promotion in the region. A Russian-enforced peace could be remarkably conducive to that end.
Despite the trauma of Armenia’s defeat in the recent Karabakh war, protests against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have been underwhelming. He may not have lived up to expectations, but few believe his rivals could offer a significantly better future.
A bloody six-week war in Nagorno-Karabakh is over, after a peace agreement brokered by Moscow was signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As the dust settles, Azerbaijan appears to be the clear winner, while Armenia has suffered a bitter defeat. There are, however, two other powers that have benefited from the conflict and the resolution effort: Turkey and Russia.
The second Karabakh War is seemingly over, and as one side celebrates and another mourns, experts, opinion makers and their ilk are trying to gauge what the Kremlin-brokered, Erdogan-approved truce might bring. How will the power balance change in the region, who are the winners and losers, and, finally, what impact will it have on Georgia? These are the topics GEORGIA TODAY put to one of the Moscow Carnegie Center's most prominent faces, Dmitri Trenin.
The November 10 agreement could turn out to be a rapidly assembled construction that is not sustainable. Moscow may need wider international support to make it work.